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Seidelson: The Feres Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insight I

THE FERES EXCEPTION TO THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT: NEW INSIGHT INTO

AN OLD PROBLEM
David E. Seidelson*

So much has already been written1 on the Feres2 exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act' (FTCA) that the reader has the right
to ask, Why another article? The answer lies in a paradox: Since
1977, when the Supreme Court seemed to endorse strongly both the

propriety of the Feres exception and the reasons underlying that doctrine,4 inferior federal courts seem to have had more, rather than
less, difficulty in determining when the Feres exception applies and
what significance attaches to each of its rationales. 5 This article,
through an examination of the reasons for the apparent confusion in
those cases, provides new insight into when and why Feres should be
applied.
* Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.A., 1951, University of Pittsburgh;
LL.B., 1956, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. See, e.g., L. JAYSON, 2 HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ch. 11 § 237 (1982);
Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (1973); Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REv. 24 (1976); Smith, How To Perfect a Claim Under the
Federal Torts Claims Act, 8 LAw NOTES 41, 42-43 (1972); Wilson, Liability to Passengersin
Military Aircraft, 42 MIL. L. REV. 101 (1968); Note, Sovereign Immunity-Federal Tort
Claims Act-Injuries to Armed Services Personnel, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1788 (1967);
Note, Torts-Rights of Servicemen under Federal Torts Claims Act, 45 N.C.L. REV. 1129
(1967); Note, Military Rights Under the FTCA, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 455 (1969); Note,
Malpractice Protection for Military Medical Personnel and the Feres Doctrine: Constitutional Tension for the Military Plaintiff. 12 U.S.F.L. REV. 525 (1978); Note, The Federal
Tort Claims Act: A Cause of Action for Servicemen, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 527 (1980).
2. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1976)[hereinafter cited as FICA].
The FTCA provides that "[tIlhe United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this
title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances .... IId. at § 2674.
4. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882
(1977).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 92-194.
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THE BACKGROUND

Feres6 was a consolidation of three cases, the first of which was
a wrongful death action arising out of the death of an active duty
soldier in a barracks fire. 7 The negligence alleged against the military personnel was the housing of the decedent in a barracks that
was unsafe because of a defective heating plant, as well as the failure to maintain an adequate fire watch.8 In the second case, a personal injury action, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries he had
sustained while on active duty and for those resulting from surgery
performed by an army surgeon. The plaintiff alleged that the surgeon had "closed-up" with a towel remaining in the incision.9 The
third case, a wrongful death action, involved the death of an active
duty soldier who had undergone surgery; the plaintiff alleged negligent treatment by the army surgeons.10 All three cases were instituted under the FTCA.11 The Supreme Court concluded that, in enacting the FTCA, Congress did not intend to permit tort recoveries
for injuries incident to military service. 2
Nevertheless, the Court candidly conceded the "iffiness" of its
determination:
There are few guiding materials for our task of statutory construction. No committee reports or floor debates disclose what effect the statute was designed to have on the problem before us, or
that it even was in mind. Under these circumstances, no conclusion
can be above challenge, but if we misinterpret the Act, at least
Congress possesses a ready remedy. 13
Indeed, the Court noted with candor those considerations implying a
contrary result:
The Act does confer district court jurisdiction generally over claims
for money damages against the United States founded on negligence. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). It does contemplate that the Government will sometimes respond for negligence of military personnel,
for it defines "employee of the Government" to include "members
of the military or naval forces of the United States," and provides
6. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
7. Id. at 137.
8. Id. at 136-37 (facts of Feres).
9. Id. at 137 (facts of Jefferson v. United States).
10. Id. (facts of United States v. Griggs).
11. Id. at 138.
12. Id. at 146.
13. Id. at 138.
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that "'acting within the scope of his office or employment', in the
case of a member of the military or naval forces of the United
States, means acting in line of duty." 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Its exceptions might also imply inclusion of claims such as we have here. 28
U.S.C. § 26800) excepts "any claim arising out of the combatant
activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war,". . . from which it is said we should infer allowance of claims arising from noncombat activities in peace. Section
14
2680(k) excludes "any claim arising in a foreign country.'
The Court declined, however, to convert the Act's broad jurisdictional grant into a determination that Congress had intended recovery for injuries incident to military service because,
[j]urisdiction is necessary to deny a claim on its merits as matter of
law as much as to adjudge that liability exists. . . . Jurisdiction of
the defendant now exists where the defendant was immune from
suit before; it remains for courts, in exercise of their jurisdiction, to
determine whether any claim is recognizable in law. 15
Thus, the Court indicated that the Act's broad jurisdictional grant
was meant to permit judicial examination on a case-by-case basis for
the purpose of determining the applicability of the FTCA.
Moreover, the Court offered a series of affirmative (and sometimes interrelated) reasons for its ultimate conclusion that the Act
did not contemplate recovery for injuries incident to military service.
1. The Act subjects the United States to liability "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances."" 6 As no analog exists under present law to the relationship between a soldier and his superior officers or the Government,17 Congress could not have contemplated liability for injuries
incident to military service. 8
2. The Act provides that the liability of the United States shall
be determined pursuant to the law of the state where the alleged
wrongful act or omission of the federal employee occurred. 19 As the
soldier has no choice as to where he is stationed, but rather, must
14.

Id.

15.

Id. at 141.

16.

28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).

17.

340

U.S. at 141-42. The Court determined that, although a civilian doctor-patient

relationship can yield liability, this is not analogous to military personnel in the same relation-

ship because the military character alone negates finding the requisite parallel circumstances.
18.
19.

Id. at 142.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
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serve where he is assigned, such a provision is unfair because it subjects him to the law of any state. Therefore, it appears that Congress
could not have intended that the Act apply to injuries incident to
such service.2 °
3. Most states provide workmen's compensation for work-connected injuries.
Absent this, or where such statutes are inapplicable, states have
differing provisions as to limitations of liability and different doctrines as to assumption of risk, fellow-servant rules and contributory or comparative negligence. It would hardly be a rational plan
of providing for those disabled in service by others in service to
leave them dependent upon geographic considerations over which
they have no control and to laws which fluctuate in existence and
value. 21
Therefore, a military person should not be subject to state law.
4. "The relationship between the Government and members of
its armed forces is 'distinctively federal in character.' "22 Consequently, Congress could not have intended to subject that relationship to the laws of the various states.23
5. Injuries incident to military service are compensable under
the Veterans' Benefits Act.24 Neither the relevant provisions, nor the
FTCA, contain a method for "adjust[ing] these two types of remedy
to each other. 25 The appropriate inference is that Congress did not
intend the FTCA to apply to injuries incident to service. 26
6. "A soldier is at peculiar disadvantage in litigation [because of
his] [1] ack of time and money [and] the difficulty if not impossibility
of procuring witnesses. '2 7 On the other hand, the veterans' "compensation system . . . normally requires no litigation . . . [and provides] recoveries [that] compare extremely favorably with those provided by most workmen's compensation statutes. 28 Under these
circumstances Congress probably realized that the latter, rather than
the former, would be the more appropriate method of providing redress for service-connected injuries.
20. 340 U.S. at 142-43.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 143.
Id. (relationship is governed by federal law and authority).
Id. at 143-44.
38 U.S.C. §§ 301-908 (1976).
340 U.S. at 144.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. (veterans compensation can exceed recovery from workmen's compensation).
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Finally, the Court concluded that "[w]e do not think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created a new cause of action dependent
on local law for service-connected injuries or death due to
negligence. 29
Analysis of the Court's Rationales
The first rationale-the absence of a soldier-government analog
in existing liability law-is contingent upon how broadly or narrowly
a court characterizes the facts in a given case. Indeed, even the
Court conceded that "if we consider relevant only a part of the circumstances and ignore the status of both the wronged and the
wrongdoer in these cases we find analogous private liability." 30 The
Court continued, however, that
[i]n the usual civilian doctor and patient relationship, there is of
course a liability for malpractice. And a landlord would undoubtedly be held liable if an injury occurred to a tenant as the result of
a negligently maintained heating plant. But the liability assumed
by the Government here is that created by "all the circumstances,"
not that which a few of the circumstances might create."
It seems to me that the Court's language is demonstrably overbroad.
For instance, no one would contend that a motorist injured when his
vehicle is struck by a negligently operated mail delivery truck could
not recover under the FTCA. The Act's applicability is apparent and
remains so even if the truck were carrying first-class mail, an activity
prohibited to any private entity. 2 Consequently, the applicability of
the FTCA simply cannot be determined by "all the circumstances"
as Feres would require. To do so would be to render the Act inapplicable to virtually every set of circumstances imaginable simply by
enlarging the facts to the point where no private entity would be
engaging in precisely the same activity as the government employee.
The second reason emphasizes the unfairness to the soldier of
resolving his claim against the government pursuant to the law of the
state where the alleged wrong occurred, given the soldier's inability
to select his duty station. 3 There are several problems related to this
rationale. First, the place of the wrong may or may not be the place
where the soldier-victim is stationed. Negligence at a military post in
29. Id. at 146.
30. Id. at 142.
31.
32.

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1696 (1976).

33. 340 U.S. at 142-43.
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state A could easily cause injury to a soldier stationed at a military
post in state B. In those circumstances, the law of state A, not that
of B, would be applicable.34 Second, and perhaps more significant, is
the awkwardness of inferring that Congress intended to "protect"
the soldier by denying him an FTCA recovery.35 Rather clearly, the
soldier-plaintiff's reaction to such presumed protection would be
"Thanks, but no thanks." By initiating an FTCA action, the soldier
could be deemed to have acquiesced in the Act's reference to the law
of the state where the negligence attributable to the government occurred, and, as a matter of practicality, would far prefer that "unfairness" to the alternative created by Feres-no tort action at all.
Finally, there is Richards v. United States,3" where the Court held
that the FTCA's reference to the law of the state where the government's negligence occurred was a reference to the total law of that
state, conflicts law as well as local law.37 Thus, a federal district
court hearing an FTCA action and finding itself confronted with a
choice-of-law problem is required to resolve that issue precisely as it
would be resolved by the highest appellate court of the state in
which the government's negligence occurred. Depending on the conflicts law of that state, lex loci delicti 8 or interest analysis,39 for
example, the ultimate local law applied could be that of the state
where the plaintiff was injured, or where the negligence occurred, or
of some other state where the greatest interest 'n the litigation lies. 40
Consequently, the above choice-of-law methodologies may mitigate
the alleged unfairness to the claimant, thereby rendering the Court's
second reason for the Feres result less than entirely persuasive.
The Court's third reason, the irrationality of applying law based
on fortuitous geographic location, seems to be a combination of two
34. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962) (plaintiff sued for injury in
one state resulting from negligence in another state).
35. This prophylactic attitude is evidenced by the Court's desire not to subject soldiers
to the laws of the several states but rather to provide uniform redress through the Veteran's
Benefits Act. See supra text accompanying note 22.
36. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
37. Id. at 11.
38. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 477-78, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746, 191
N.E.2d 279, 280-81 (1963) (place of tort determines governing law).
39. Id. at 479-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 747-51, 191 N.E.2d at 282-85 (the law of the state
with the greatest interest should govern).

40. See, e.g., Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 257, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1973). The
Third Circuit concluded that, under the conflicts law of New York (the state where the negli-

gence attributable to the government occurred), the recovery for gratuitous nursing services
would be governed by the local law of New Jersey because that state was the domicile of the

victim and the place where the services had been rendered.
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elements. First, in most states, work-connected injuries are covered
by a workmen's compensation statute, and thus no tort liability is
imposed.4 1 Consequently, treating injuries incident to military service as they would be treated by state law would lead to a similar
conclusion-no tort liability. Second, where state law would permit a
tort recovery, the available defenses and the amount of recovery
would vary dramatically from state to state, 42 thus subjecting soldier-claimants to "geographic considerations over which they have
no control." With respect to the second element, it is fair to infer
that the soldier-plaintiff's reaction to this "protection" would be
"Thanks, but no thanks." The possibility of a tort recovery under
any state's law, from the plaintiff's perspective, would be preferable
to the Court's "protective" conclusion of no tort recovery at all. As
to the first element, it is true that if a state workmen's compensation
statute applies, the injured claimant most likely will be denied a tort
action against his employer.4 3 That conclusion, however, is mandated
by the exclusivity clause 44 in each workmen's compensation statute,
which explicitly precludes such a tort action. A similar exclusivity
clause is not contained in the Veterans' Benefits Act,45 even though
Congress presumably was aware of the existence of such clauses in
state workmen's compensation statutes.
Of the Court's fourth reason, the impropriety of imposing state
law on the "distinctively federal" relationship between soldier and
government, there is little doubt that the relationship between the
government and any of its employees is distinctively federal. Almost
all such relationships are governed by a plethora of federal constitutional provisions, laws or regulations. Immunizing the government
41.

340 U.S. at 143.

42.

Id.

43. Id.
44. The Tennessee workmen's compensation law, like similar compensation laws in other
states, replaced all common law rights that an injured employee might have had against an
employer for work-related injuries with statutory benefits. T.C.A. § 50-908 provides as follows:
Right to compensation exclusive.-The rights and remedies herein granted to an

employee subject to the Workmen's Compensation Law on account of personal injury or death by accident, including a minor whether lawfully or unlawfully em-

ployed, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal
representative, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account

of such injury or death.
Nearly every workmen's compensation law contains an equivalent section. In interpreting the

above section, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that "[t]his Act constitutes a complete
substitute for previous remedies in tort on the part of an employee. . . ." Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Stevenson, 212 Tenn. 178, 182, 368 S.W.2d 760, 762 (1963).

45. 38 U.S.C. § 740 (1976).
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from FTCA liability in those actions where the alleged tortfeasor is
a federal employee would render the Act meaningless. The "distinctively federal" relationship may immunize the government from tort
liability where the claimant is a civilian federal employee, but that is
because a provision of the Federal Employees Compensation Act
(FECA) provides that receipt of FECA benefits precludes an FTCA
action. 4 Even if we focus, however, on the particular relationship
between the soldier-tortfeasor and the government, the potential application of state law to determine the liability consequences does not
generally lead to the conclusion of governmental immunity. For instance, a civilian plaintiff injured by the negligence of a soldier "acting in line of duty" may maintain an FTCA action, even though in
such an action state law will be applied in effect to the relationship
between military tortfeasor and federal government.4
It should be noted, too, that in Feres the Court did not precisely
identify the "distinctively federal" relationship alluded to. Was it the
relationship between soldier-claimant and government (the "firstlevel" relationship) or the relationship between soldier-tortfeasor and
government (the "second-level" relationship)? 48 In the three cases
decided in Feres both the victims and the alleged tortfeasors were
military personnel; 49 consequently whichever relationship the Court
contemplated was satisfied. Yet, the distinction between the two relationships may help determine if there is impropriety in imposing
state law upon a federal relationship. 50
The fifth reason for the Feres result was the availability of veterans' benefits for service-connected injuries and the congressional
failure to "adjust" those benefits with the FTCA. The flaw in this
reasoning is demonstrated by the Court's recognition of alternative
46. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976). See Levine v. United States, 478 F. Supp. 1389 (D.
Mass. 1979).
47. Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) (United States impleaded
as a third party defendant in suit by civilian plaintiffs injured in a collision with a government
vehicle).
48. There is language in Feres implying that both levels must exist as a precondition to
the nonapplicability of the FTCA. As noted in the text, when discussing reason one, the Court
referred to "the status of both the wronged and the wrongdoer," 340 U.S. at 142, and, when
discussing reason three, the Court referred to "those disabled in service by others in service."
Id. at 143. In my opinion, both levels should be found to exist before the Feres exception is
imposed. If the first-level relationship, that between soldier-plaintiff and government, does not
exist, Feres is inapplicable by its own terms. If the second-level relationship, that between
military tortfeasor and government, does not exist, there would seem to be no impropriety in
imposing state law. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92.
49. See 340 U.S. at 136-37.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 130-31.
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conclusions:
We might say that the claimant may (a) enjoy both types of recovery, or (b) elect which to pursue, thereby waiving the other, or (c)
pursue both, crediting the larger liability with the proceeds of the
smaller, or (d) that the compensation and pension remedy excludes
the tort remedy. There is as much statutory authority for one as for
another of these conclusions."
The Court's final reason rested on the soldier's peculiar disadvantage in litigation and the fact that the veterans' compensation
system normally does not require litigation.5 2 Again, the soldier's response to such "solicitude" would be "Thanks, but no thanks." Presumably, the soldier who files an FTCA action would prefer to cope
with the disadvantages posed by litigation rather than be denied a
tort recovery-the Feres rule. And, of course, the peculiar disadvantage of the soldier-lack of time and money, difficulty in procuring
witnesses-might have little or no bearing on a wrongful death action brought by a deceased soldier's personal representative, and, at
most, a diminished bearing on a personal injury action initiated after
the victim's separation from service.
My purpose in identifying each of the Court's reasons in Feres
and some of the weaknesses inherent in those reasons is not to persuade the reader that the Feres result was wrong. It is too late for
that. Rather, I believe identification and analysis of each of those
reasons may be helpful in answering the essential question: When
should Feres be deemed applicable? The appealing heuristic tone of
the Feres opinion invites just that kind of analysis; the more recent
cases demand it.
RECENT CASE ANALYSIS

Stencel's Bold Lettering
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Stencel Aero Engineering
Corp. v. United States.53 Captain John Donham, of the Missouri Air
National Guard, was injured when the life-support system of his
fighter aircraft malfunctioned."' To recover for his injuries, Donham
sued the United States under the FTCA and sued Stencel, the manufacturer of the ejection system. Accordingly, Stencel sued the
51. 340 U.S. at 144.
52. Id. at 145.
53. 431 U.S. 666, rehg denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977).
54. Id. at 667.
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United States for indemnity as to any judgment Donham might secure against Stencel8 5 The federal district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff, finding
that Donham's injuries were incident to military service. 56 Accepting
the district court's conclusion that the "plaintiff's status as a Missouri Air National Guard pilot is sufficiently related to federal military service to apply the Feres ruling," 57 there is little room to contest the court's conclusion that Donham's injuries were incident to
military service. The district court also granted the government's
motion for summary judgment against Stencel's cross-claim, noting
that "to allow Stencel to recover against the United States on indemnity is to allow recovery indirectly of what could not be recovered by the injured plaintiff directly." 8 That seems to be a wholly
rational basis for rejecting Stencel's claimed right to indemnification.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, 59 concluding more broadly that "the
rights and duties of the United States arising pursuant to its contractual obligations primarily are governed by federal common law," 60
thus Congress could not have intended that the FTCA's mandate to
apply state law be applicable to Stencel's indemnification claim. The
Supreme Court affirmed. 6 '
The Supreme Court, like the district court, noted that to permit
Stencel's claim "'would be to judicially admit at the back door that
which has been legislatively turned away at the front door.' "62 In
addition, however, the Court felt compelled to resolve the tension s
between Feres and United States v. Yellow Cab Co." According to
the opinion in Stencel, the Court in Yellow Cab held that "the
[FTCA] permits impleading the Government as a third-party defendant, under a theory of indemnity or contribution, if the original defendant claims that the United States was wholly or partially responsible for the plaintiff's injury."8 5 But the two cases decided in Yellow
Cab were easily distinguishable from Stencel; none of the plaintiffs
55. Id. at 668.
56. Donham v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
57. Id. at 53.
58. Id.
59. Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976), affid sub nom. Stencel
Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
60. 536 F.2d at 769.
61. 431 U.S. 666, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977).
62. Id. at 673 (quoting Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972)).
63. Id. at 670.
64. 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
65. 431 U.S. 666, 669-70 (citation omitted).
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in those cases were in military service,6 6 thus, the Feres considerations were not controlling. Consequently, permitting the United
States to be impleaded in those cases did not circumvent legislative
intent. So much for the "tension" between Feres and Yellow Cab.
Apparently, however, the Court did not adopt this position, for it
deemed it appropriate, in support of its affirmance of the Eighth Circuit, to demonstrate that the reasons underlying the Feres doctrine
were equally applicable to the cross-claim asserted by Stencel
against the United States, even though the plaintiff in Stencel was in
the military.67 Whether or not that demonstration was necessary, it
affords the opportunity of examining the reasons underlying the
Feres doctrine as most recently stated by the Supreme Court. By the
time Stencel was decided, the Court had distilled those reasons to
three: First, "the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as a substitute
for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme. . .."-8
Second, the "'distinctively

federal' .

.

. relationship between the

Government and its soldiers" makes the FTCA's application of state
law senseless. 9 Third, subjecting "military orders" to judicial "second-guessing" would have an adverse effect on military discipline.70
It is apparent from the Court's opinion that the Feres uncertainty about the propriety of the military-service exception to the
FTCA and the reasons underlying that exception has been assuaged.
The certainty as to the first point is entirely explicable: After all, in
the twenty-seven71 years since Feres, Congress had not utilized its
"ready remedy" to correct any erroneous reading of legislative intent; congressional inaction implies acquiescence.
Determining that "the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes

. . .

a

substitute for tort liability" 72 seems inconsistent with the Court's
opinions in Brooks v. United States7 3 (a pre-Feres decision) and
66.

In one case, the victims were civilian passengers in a cab that collided with a mail

truck. The passengers sued the cab company which then impleaded the United States as a
third-party defendant for the sake of securing contribution. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 544-45.
In the other case, the victim was a passenger on a streetcar that collided with a jeep driven by
a soldier. The passenger sued the transit company which then impleaded the United States as
a third-party defendant, seeking contribution. Id. at 545.
67. 431 U.S. at 672-73.
68. Id. at 671.
69. Id. at 672.
70. See id.at 673.
71. See supra text accompanying note 13.
72.

431 U.S. at 671.

73.

337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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United States v. Brown74 (a post-Feres decision). In Brooks, the
Court concluded that the soldier-victim's injuries, sustained while
the soldier was on leave and occasioned by the negligence of a civilian employee driving an army vehicle, were compensable under the
FTCA, even assuming that the victim would receive compensation
for those injuries under the Veterans' Benefits Act.75 Apparently, the
Court in Brooks did not contemplate a duplicative recovery. It asserted that
this does not mean that the amount payable under servicemen's
benefit laws should not be deducted, or taken into consideration,
when the serviceman obtains judgment under the Tort Claims Act.
Without the benefit of argument in this Court, or discussion of the
matter in the Court of Appeals, we now see no indication that Congress meant the United States to pay twice for the same injury.71
In Brown,77 the plaintiff had sustained an injury to his left knee
while in the service, for which he received veterans' benefits. After
his discharge, the plaintiff had the injured knee operated on in a
veterans' hospital. Due to the use of an allegedly defective tourniquet
during the surgery, the plaintiff sustained serious and permanent injury to the nerves in the leg. For that aggravation of the injury, he
received an increase in the veterans' benefits received. In addition,
the plaintiff brought an FTCA action to recover for the surgery-related injury.78 The government, relying on Feres, moved to dismiss.
Although the district court granted the motion,7 9 the court of appeals reversed"0 and the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision.81 After noting that the injury for which plaintiff
sought tort damages had occurred after the plaintiff's discharge, and,
therefore, was not incident to service,8 2 the Court declared that the
receipt of veterans' benefits alone did not preclude an FTCA action,
74. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
75. See 337 U.S. at 53. "Unlike the usual workman's compensation statute, e.g., 33
U.S.C. § 905, there is nothing in the Tort Claims Act or the veterans' laws which provides for
exclusiveness of remedy .... Nor did Congress provide for an election of remedies, as in the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 757." Id.
76. Id.
77. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
78. Id. at 110-11.
79. "The District Court agreed with the contention of petitioner that respondent's sole
relief was under the Veterans Act and dismissed his complaint under the Tort Claims Act."
348 U.S. at I 1.The district court's dismissal apparently is unreported.
80. Brown v. United States, 209 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1954).
81. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
82. See id. at 112.
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since Congress had not made the Veterans' Benefits Act the exclusive remedy. 3
Congress could, of course, make the compensation system the
exclusive remedy. .

.

. We noted in the Brooks case

. . .

that the

usual workmen's compensation statute was in this respect different
from those governing veterans, that Congress had given no indication that it made the right to compensation the veteran's exclusive
remedy, that the receipt of disability payments under the Veterans
Act was not an election of remedies and did not preclude recovery
of any
under the Tort Claims Act but only reduced the amount
84
judgment under the latter act. We adhere to that result.
Both Brooks and Brown are distinguishable, however, from the
usual Feres-type case. In Brooks, the serviceman's injuries occurred
while he was on leave and were not incident to his military service.8 5
In Brown, the specific injury for which tort damages were sought
occurred while the plaintiff was a civilian."6 Yet, the opinions in the
two cases make it clear that claimant's eligibility for, or even actual
receipt of, veterans' benefits does not automatically bar an FTCA
action. Consequently, the first reason offered by the Court in
StencelJ8 7 does not, of itself, preclude recovery under the Act.
The "distinctively federal relationship between the Government
and its soldiers," the second reason offered in Stencel, remains something of an enigma. Which relationship is referred to, that between
plaintiff and government or that between tortfeasor and government? On the surface, the relationship would seem to be that between plaintiff and government, since it is only when the plaintiff's
injury was incident to service that Feres has potential applicability. 88
If it is the relationship between plaintiff and government, why is it
patently senseless to apply state law? Senselessness cannot be derived from the "unfairness" to the claimant arising from the application of state law, as noted in Feres,89 because this element seems to
have been distilled out by the time Stencel was decided.
In Stencel, the emphasis seems to have shifted to the impropriety of judging the government's military actions and decisions by va83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 113.
Id. (citations omitted).
337 U.S. at 50.
348 U.S. at 112.
See supra text accompanying note 68.
See 340 U.S. at 144.
Id. at 143.
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rying state laws. That conclusion seems far more sensible and compelling than the Feres concern about unfairness to the claimant. 90
Moreover, that more firmly based concern implies that it is the relationship between the alleged military tortfeasor and the government
that is not to be judged by varying state laws. That conclusion suggests that when the soldier-claimant's injury is the result of the negligence of civilian federal employees not engaged in military actions
or decisions, Feres should be deemed inapplicable and the FTCA
available.
The third reason offered by Stencel, that judicial "second-guessing" of "military orders" would have an adverse effect on military
discipline,9 1 has a compelling legitimacy. After all, if every or even
most military orders were vulnerable to judicial review, those in service and subject to those orders might be encouraged to reject or
disregard those orders until judicial "approval" were obtained.
Clearly that is no way to run an army. Perhaps equally as clear, it
follows that this reason for the Feres exception should be deemed
applicable only where judicial cognizance of an FTCA action seems
likely to generate such an adverse effect on military discipline.
If Feres is combined with all of Brooks, Brown and Stencel, the
following conclusions seem tenable: One, the FTCA gives federal
district courts jurisdiction to determine when the Feres doctrine requires governmental immunity. Two, the mere fact that the victim of
negligence receives veterans' benefits for his injuries does not preclude an FTCA action for damages. Three, an FTCA action arising
out of an injury incident to service should be deemed to be precluded
only when (a) such an action would improperly subject the relationship between military tortfeasor and federal government to state law,
or (b) such an action and its concomitant judicial review of military
decisions or actions would be likely to generate an adverse effect on
military discipline. To put it another way, the Feres exception to the
FTCA should be deemed applicable only to those cases in which its
underlying rationales apply.
Post-Stencel Decisions: Analysis Applied
In Uptegrove v. United States,92 Navy Lieutenant Edwin
90, See supra text accompanying notes 33-40 for a discussion of the awkwardness of the
Feres Court's unfairness argument. The omission of this factor in Stencel indicates that the
invalidity of that concern was realized.
91. 431 U.S. at 673.
92.

600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
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Uptegrove left Japan on furlough on board an Air Force jet destined
for Washington. He planned to visit his family in California. Space
on the jet was available to Uptegrove due to his active duty status in
the United States Navy. The jet approached the airport under poor
visibility conditions, and although the pilots complied with the instructions from an air traffic controller, the transport collided with
Mount Constance and all on board were killed.93
Lieutenant Uptegrove's widow brought a wrongful death action
against the United States under the FTCA, seeking damages for
herself and her two minor children.94 The plaintiff alleged that the
FAA controllers had been negligent and that, under a respondeat
superior theory, the United States should be held liable. The government's motion for summary judgment, based on Feres, was granted
by the district court95 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 96 emphasizing
that
[w]hile on the C-141, Uptegrove was subject to the command of
the military flight crew, and could be disciplined before a military
court for violating provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
Uptegrove was subject to military discipline while he was on the C141, .

.

. [and] the fact that he was on leave and voluntarily

boarded the transport does not 97alter the fact that the activity was
incident to his military service.
The emphasis on the fact that decedent "was subject to the
command

. . .

of the flight crew" and could have been court-mar-

tialed for any violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) while on board, is puzzling. After all, decedent violated
neither a military command nor any provision of the UCMJ. His
death, according to the allegations in the complaint, was due to no
conduct on his part or to any negligence on the part of the flight
crew. Rather, death resulted from the negligence of civilian employees of the United States9B
The court apparently was willing to concede the plaintiff's contention that, since the alleged tortfeasors were civilian employees of
93.

600 F.2d at 1249.

94.

Id. at 1248.

95. The district court's granting of summary judgment apparently is not reported.
96.

600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979).

97.

Id. at 1249-50.

98.

Id.
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the government, an FTCA action would pose no threat to military
discipline.99 The court, however, concluded that not all three of the
reasons set forth in Stencel had to be present in order to bar the
action: "The Supreme Court has never indicated that Feres should
be limited only to situations in which interference with military discipline is threatened." 100 The receipt of veterans' benefits alone will
not preclude an FTCA action,101 and if any threat to military discipline is eliminated, as the Uptegrove court apparently was willing to
do, only one reason remains for barring the action: The distinctively
federal character of the relationship between the government and
members of its Armed Forces, and the impropriety of imposing state
law on that relationship. The Uptegrove court held that the relationship referred to was that between victim and government,1 02 the
first-level relationship. Consequently, since the decedent had been in
the Navy, the wrongful death action was barred. Earlier on, however, we concluded that the legal significance of that "distinctively
federal relationship" is such that it should be immune from an inappropriate application of state law.' 0 3 While it is true that the ultimate liability of the government in Uptegrove might have been determined by Washington state law, the relationship to which that
state law would have been applied was that between the civilian air
traffic controllers and the federal government-allegedly negligent
employees and potentially liable employer. Lieutenant Uptegrove
was simply a victim of that relationship, as were all those on board
the plane. Since the impact of state law would have been felt on the
relationship between the allegedly negligent civilian employees and
their federal government employer, not on any military conduct by
those employees,' there would seem to have been no impropriety in
the application of state law. The Uptegrove action, if permitted,
would not improperly have subjected the relationship between military tortfeasor and federal government to state law. Consequently,
99. See id. at 1250.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 72-84.
102. 600 F.2d at 1250-51.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
104. It could be asserted, of course, that assisting an Air Force transport in landing
constitutes military conduct. The impropriety of imposing state law on a "distinctively federal
relationship," however, exists only where the military conduct is uniquely military in nature,
not where the military conduct is closely analogous to similar civilian conduct. See infra text
accompanying notes 185-90. Rather clearly, the conduct of the civilian controllers was closely
analogous to their conduct in assisting civilian planes in landing.
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the only remaining reason for the Feres exception would seem inapplicable to the facts of Uptegrove. Since (a) receipt of veterans' benefits alone will not bar an action, (b) the court itself concluded that
permitting the action would have generated no threat to military discipline, and (c) permitting the action would not improperly have
subjected the relationship between military tortfeasor and federal
government to state law, I am inclined to think that the Ninth Circuit arrived at the wrong result.
In Woodside v. United States,0 5 Captain Henry W. Schroeder,
an active duty officer in the Air Force, was killed in an airplane
crash. He was on a five-day leave and "was receiving flight instruction toward a commercial pilot's license."10 The decedent's widow
brought a wrongful death action under the FTCA. The government
moved to dismiss on the basis of Feres.
"Captain Schroeder was not a military pilot, nor did his military duties require that he have a pilot's license or fly as a member
of a flight crew. 10°7 His interest in aviation was purely personal. 108
Captain Schroeder received his flight instruction from a civilian instructor at the Hickman-Wheeler Air Force Base Aero Club. Active
membership in the club was limited to individuals who were active
duty military personnel of the United States Armed Forces. Associate membership was available to military-related personnel.109
The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss110
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the basis that
Feres requires that there be some proximate relationship between
the service member's activity and the Armed Forces. Where the
two are closely associated or naturally related, the activity will be
deemed "incident to service" even though not an essential or integral part of the mission of the Armed Forces and even though not
directly involving a command relationship between the soldier and
the military.
[W]e find the link between the Air Force and the Club sufficient to bring Captain Schroeder's flight instructions within the
105.

606 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904. (1980).

106.

606 F.2d at 136.

107.

Id.

108.

Id.

109. Id. Military-related personnel includes: "families of active duty service members,
civilian Department of Defense employees and their families, and members of Congress." Id.
110. Woodside v. United States, No. Civ. 1-75 477 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 1977).
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realm of activities incident to his military service.'
Consider, however, Stencel's three reasons for the Feres exception to the FTCA. Should not the court have made some effort to
determine which, if any, of those reasons were applicable to the facts
of Woodside for the purpose of determining the applicability of
Feres?
Mrs. Schroeder received military compensation benefits as the
result of her husband's death.11 2 Yet Brooks and Brown prove that
that fact alone does not justify a Feres dismissal. Would permitting
the action to proceed have resulted in improperly subjecting the "distinctively federal relationship between the Government and its
soldiers" to state law? If the relationship referred to is that between
victim and government, the answer might be yes. After all, Captain
Schroeder, although on leave, was an active duty officer in the Air
Force. But if the real "evil" in the application of state law to a distinctively federal relationship is that military conduct or decisions
would be judged by various and possibly conflicting state laws for
the purpose of determining liability, the application of state law
would not be improper. The alleged tortfeasor was the civilian flight
instructor: At the time of the operative facts, the instructor was engaged in no military conduct or decision. 1 3 Subjecting his conduct
and decisions to state law would not mandate subjecting the relationship between a military tortfeasor and the federal government to
state law for the purpose of determining the liability of the latter.
Consequently, the second reason for the Feres exception, as delineated in Stencel, would seem to be inapplicable. Would permitting
Woodside to proceed have been likely to generate an adverse effect
on military discipline by subjecting military conduct or decisions to
judicial scrutiny? I think not, because, as already noted, the only
negligence alleged was that of the civilian flight instructor.1 1 4 Consequently, permitting the action to proceed would have resulted in judicial scrutiny of nonmilitary conduct or decisions only. In addition,
Captain Schroeder's flying lessons were neither a part of his military
duty nor available only to military personnel. 15 Therefore, even if
the court were to find the flight instructor's conduct negligent, there
would seem to be little or no risk that military personnel would be
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

606 F.2d at 141-42.
Id. at 137.
See Id.
Id.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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dissuaded from complying with any military orders. After all, Woodside involved no military orders. Consequently, only the first of
Stencel's three reasons applied to Woodside, and, because the receipt
of compensation is not alone sufficient to bar the action,116 it would
seem that the government's motion to dismiss should have been
denied.
In Parker v. United States,117 Specialist Five Jack Lowe Parker
was granted a five-day leave from duty in order to move his family
to a new residence. Parker, on his way home on leave, was struck
head-on by a military vehicle that entered Parker's lane of traffic.
Parker was driving a car borrowed from a civilian. The collision occurred on an Army-maintained road within Fort Hood. Parker died
from injuries sustained in the accident and his family received veterans' benefits.118 The surviving widow brought a wrongful death action under the FTCA. The government's motion for summary judgment based on Feres was granted by the district court 1 9 but the
1 20
Fifth Circuit reversed.
The Fifth Circuit examined each of the three reasons for the
Feres exception set forth in Stencel. With regard to veterans' benefits, the court said: "The existence and acceptance of the benefits is
not.

. .

an accurate barometer for the threshold question of whether

the activity is 'incident to service.' The compensation system does
not exclude FTCA remedies but it is rather the sole remedy once it
is determined the injury is service connected." 1 21 As to the "distinctively federal character of the soldier-Government relation," the
Fifth Circuit concluded that "[w]hile the federal character of the
relationship may be relevant to the wisdom of adopting an exception
for service members, it does not help define when an injury is incurred 'incident to service.""" And, finally, with regard to "the effect FTCA suits may have on the maintenance of discipline," the
court concluded that "[a]gain, this factor is more relevant to the
decision whether to imply an exception than it is to the exception's
application."12 3 There is, I think, a ringing condemnation implicit in
116. See supra text accompanying notes 75-84.
117. 611 F.2d 1007, reh'g denied, 615 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1980).
118. 611 F.2d at 1008.
119. 437 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
120. 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980).
121. Id. at 1012.
122. Id.

123. Id. at 1013. There is an additional problem with the Stencel reasons for the Feres
bar. We know that if a civilian is injured by military negligence, the civilian plaintiff will be
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those conclusions arrived at by the Fifth Circuit. In effect, that court
found that although Stencel's three reasons might explain why the
Feres exception was fashioned, none were helpful in determining
when Feres is applicable. That means that the reasons for the rule
offer no guidance as to when the rule should be applied. Normally,
when the applicability of a rule of law is at issue, the most efficient
(and perhaps most appropriate) method of resolving that issue is to
determine the reasons underlying the rule and decide which if any is
applicable to the case sub judice. When that cannot be done, the
rule of law itself becomes suspect.12' After all, if its underlying reasons shed no light on its applicability, the rule in fact may lack an
appropriate rationale. Perhaps that is the case with the Feres exception to the FTCA.
Feres itself is a Supreme Court determination of legislative intent in which Congress apparently has acquiesced. 125 This indicates
that Feres is an accurate reading of the congressional intent and, as
such, the rule must be correct. In Stencel, we have a Supreme Court
distillation of the reasons underlying Feres which is a product of
twenty-seven years of judicial reflection. Surely, in those circumstances, the Court cannot so seriously have blundered that its stated
reasons shed no light on when Feres is to be applied. Indeed, in
Stencel, the Court itself purported to demonstrate the applicability
of Feres to Stencel's cross-claim against the United States by demonstrating the applicability of the three reasons for the exception to
the federal contractor's asserted claim. Was the Fifth Circuit simply
and patently wrong, then, in concluding that none of Stencel's reasons help determine when Feres is applicable?
That may be too strong a statement. After all, the court itself
has concluded that one of those reasons-the receipt of veterans'
benefits-does not itself preclude an FTCA action.128 Moreover, the
able to maintain an FTCA action even though such an action may result in judging military
acts or decisions by state law or judicially "second-guessing" the military act or decision which
occasioned the injury. Why should a different result obtain simply because the plaintiff is a
soldier? The answer must be a Supreme Court determination (acquiesced in by Congress) that
the evils of judging military acts or decisions by state law and judicially second-guessing military acts or decisions would be exacerbated in those cases in which plaintiff is an active-duty
soldier. And where the victim is a soldier, his economic losses will be ameliorated by free
military care and the possibility of veterans' benefits.
124.

Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 14 (1982) (Texas

statute denying public education to children of illegal aliens violates equal protection where a
valid legislative intent could not be gleaned).
125.
126.

See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
611 F.2d at 1012.
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Court has not explicitly stated whether the "distinctively federal relationship" which should not be governed by state law is that between soldier-victim and government or that between military
tortfeasor and government. Resolving which relationship is the critical federal relationship may even have some bearing on the concern
for preserving military discipline. In those circumstances, it becomes
at least explicable why the Fifth Circuit in Parkerdid not find any
of Stencel's three reasons to be readily and apparently useful in determining when the Feres exception applies. Perhaps a somewhat
more penetrating analysis of those reasons can help a court determine the applicability of Feres.
According to this analysis, the Parker family received veterans'
benefits,127 which is alone insufficient to determine the applicability
of Feres. 28 In Parker, both the victim and the alleged tortfeasor
were military personnel. 2 That would imply that, whichever "distinctively federal relationship" is not to be governed by state law, the
second Stencel reason would apply. In a footnote, however, the
Parker court said, "[w]e doubt [that the tortfeasor] had orders to
cross the road at the time of the collision." 130 That language suggests that, although the alleged tortfeasor was a soldier and even
though he was carrying out some military assignment at the time of
the fatal collision, the specific act of negligence alleged had no intimate relationship with the military assignment involved. Thus, determining the liability of the government by the application of Texas
law would not subject military conduct or decisions to state law.
Rather, state law would determine only the liability-generating consequences of driving a vehicle across the center line of the roadway-conduct clearly not within the military mission of the alleged
tortfeasor. Consequently, the second Stencel reason for the Feres exception would seem to be inapplicable.
Subjecting the tortfeasor's alleged conduct-driving across the
center line of a roadway-to judicial scrutiny seems unlikely to generate an adverse effect on military discipline, thus eliminating the
need for the third major concern of StenceL It is not likely that
others in similar circumstances would be deterred from carrying out
127. Id. at 1008.
128. On this point, the Fifth Circuit may have been entirely correct in its conclusion
that "[tihe compensation system does not exclude FTCA remedies but it is rather the sole
remedy once it is determined the injury is service connected." Id. at 1012.
129. Id. at 1008.
130. Id. at 1012 n.7.
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whatever military mission the tortfeasor was about to undertake
when he inadvertently crossed the dividing line. Deterrence of others
in Parker's circumstances-attempting to drive home on furlough
time to move their families to new residences-is also improbable.
Therefore, the third reason for the Feres exception would seem inapplicable to Parker.The only one of the three reasons having applicability to the case is the receipt of veterans' benefits, and the Court
itself has decided that that alone does not justify imposing the Feres
bar.13 ' It would seem, then, that the Fifth Circuit, in reversing the
granting of the government's motion for summary judgment, arrived
at precisely the correct conclusion. Moreover, the propriety of that
conclusion, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's language, can be corroborated by recourse to the three reasons set forth in Stencel.
Miller v. United States,132 affords additional opportunity with
which to evaluate the breadth of Feres. Douglas Miller was on active
duty in the United States Army at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. On
June 23, 1977, after completing his military duties and with the
knowledge and permission of his superior officer, Miller reported to a
part-time civilian job. He was there employed by George Rodman, a
civilian subcontractor, to erect scaffolds on government-owned family quarters. While so employed, Miller was electrocuted by an aluminium ladder that came into contact with a main electrical power
line. 133 Miller's parents brought a wrongful death action against the
United States, alleging negligence in the maintenance of and the
failure to de-energize an uninsulated electric wire owned and controlled by the Department of the Army.1 34 The government, asserting the applicability of Feres, moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion,1 35 a three-judge panel of the
36 the Eighth Circuit en banc
Eighth Circuit, dividing 2-1, reversed,
1 7
later affirmed the district court.
The two-judge majority opinion of the Eighth Circuit panel eschewed a "mechanical application of the Feres doctrine [to all cases
where the victim was injured on base or while on active duty status,
despite its] 'virtue of simplicity,' [and opted instead for a test that]
131. Id. at 1015.
132.
133.

134.
135.
643 F.2d
136.
137.

643 F.2d 481, rev'd on reh'g (en banc), 643 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1980).
643 F.2d at 482.

Id. at 487 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
478 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Mo. 1979), affd, 643 F.2d 481, rev'd on reh'g (en banc),
490 (8th Cir. 1980).
643 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 490.
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would involve difficult questions of fact."' 138 That specific factual inquiry would seem to be consistent with the spirit of the language in
Feres which noted that the FTCA's broad jurisdictional grant was as
necessary to deny a claim on its merits as matter of law as [it was]
to adjudge that liability exists. .

.

.Jurisdiction of the defendant

now exists where the defendant was immune from suit before; it
remains for courts, in exercise of their jurisdiction, to determine

whether any claim is recognizable in law.

39

Applying that specific factual inquiry to Miller, the panel concluded that "[e]ven though he was on active duty and on a military
base, [Miller] was exactly in the same position as any civilian employee of the private contractor might have been at that time and
place.' 140 Consequently, the panel found that "PFC Miller's death
did not arise out of activities incident to service, and, therefore, the
4
facts of the case do not fall within the rationale of Feres."1
The Eighth Circuit en banc, although arriving at a contrary ul' 142
timate conclusion, like the panel, also rejected "a per se rule
which would apply Feres to every case in which the victim was on
active duty and on base when injured, despite its "virtue of easy application. 1 43 Instead, the court chose "the better jurisprudential
course.

.

.[of] examin[ing] the facts of each case as they arise and

determin[ing] whether they fall within the reasons given by the Su'144
preme Court for its conclusion in Feres.
Instead of applying the three distinct reasons given by the Supreme Court in Stencel, the court reverted in part to those reasons
originally set forth in Feres and apparently distilled out by Stencel.
The court en banc reiterated the anomaly of applying "'the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred'" to a relationship that
is "'distinctively federal in character'" since to do so, would be unfair to "soldiers on active duty, who have no choice and must serve
any place where they are assigned."'1 5 The court found that reason
applicable to Miller because, "[l]ike all soldiers, he was at a particu138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 485-86.
340 U.S. at 141.
643 F.2d at 487.
Id.
See id. at 493.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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lar post not because he had chosen it, but because of his orders."'1 46
Next, the court noted that "Congress had provided by statute 'systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or
death of those in armed services.' ",147 Since Miller's survivors were
entitled to compensation under these acts, without proof of fault or
negligence, Feres barred the action. 148 This determination seems inconsistent with Brown and Brooks and their conclusions, never reversed by the Supreme Court, that receipt of veterans' benefits alone
did not require the application of Feres. The balance of the court's
rationale seems to be based substantially on the per se rule that the
court purportedly rejected.
Private Miller was on active duty; he was not on leave, pass, or
furlough; the injury occurred on a military base to which he was
assigned and the work he was doing, though not under the immediate supervision of his military superiors, was related to the military
mission of the base, since it involved construction of residential
quarters to be owned by the Government and located on the base.
Although he had been given permission by his military superiors to
work at a part-time job during off-duty hours, he remained at all
times subject to immediate recall for military duty.14 9
Consequently, Feres was found to bar the action.
The three dissenters1 50 acquiesced in the majority's view that
there are several rationales supporting the Feres doctine,151 yet they
concluded that "[s]ubsequent Supreme Court decisions have . . .
[shown that] the feared effect on military discipline remains the
most significant justification for barring servicepersons' tort
claims.11 52 The dissenters, too, conceded the uncertainty of determining when Feres should apply:
Divining the limits of the Feres doctrine has been a difficult
task. The key term-"incident to service"-has never been defined
by the Supreme Court. Many lower courts have tended to automat146. Id. at 494.
147. Id. at 493.
148. Id. at 494.
149. Id.
150. Judge Heaney was joined by Judges Ross and McMillan.
151. Id. at 496 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citations ommited). The rationales include: (1)
that the distinctively federal relationship should not be disturbed by state law, (2) the absence
of a private tort analog, (3) the existence of the veterans' benefit compensation system, and (4)
the "peculiar and special relationship" between soldiers and their superiors and the ramifications thereof. Id.
152. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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ically deny tort claims of servicepersons injured on a military base
or while they were on active duty. In so doing, the courts have
153
distorted the intent of Congress.
In light of the above considerations, the dissenters believed that
giving effect to the intent of Congress entailed not barring the action
against the government. In support of their conclusion that Miller's
death was not incident to service-thereby dispelling concern for the
effect of the action on military discipline-the dissenters asserted
that
[a]t the time of his death, Private Miller was not engaged in an
activity incident to his service. He was working in a civilian capacity for a private contractor. He was off duty and had been given
permission by his military superiors to work the part-time job. He
was not involved in any military mission or under compulsion of
any military orders. He was not availing himself of a privilege acquired by virtue of his military status. He was subject to the direct
control and
authority of his civilian employer, not his military
154
superiors.

What is the significance of the fact that Miller was working in a
civilian capacity with regard to Stencel's reasons? It might be asserted that, given the civilian nature of Miller's activity at the time
of the fatal injury, the distinctively federal character of the relationship between soldier and government did not exist at the first level,
i.e., between victim and federal government. If Feres is never applicable when that first-level relationship is not distinctively federal in
character, that alone could explain the dissenters' conclusion. Moreover, the civilian nature of Miller's activity at the time of injury is
relevant with regard to the "discipline" reason of Feres. Since
Miller's activity was neither compelled by military orders nor encouraged for morale or recreational purposes, subjecting the military
conduct involved-maintaining an uninsulated power line and failing
to de-energize the line-to judicial scrutiny hardly would be likely to
generate an adverse effect on military discipline. Any soldier on the
post would be entirely free to refrain from taking a part-time job
with a civilian employer, whether or not Miller proceeded to trial.
The civilian nature of Miller's activity, however, would not eliminate
the distinctively federal character of the relationship between alleged
tortfeasor and government. Presumably, the maintenance of the
153. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 497 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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power line and the decision not to de-energize the line were the ultimate responsibilities of military personnel. If Miller were to proceed
to trial, the law of Alaska would be applied to determine the propriety of the manner in which those responsibilities had been fulfilled
and the ultimate liability of the government. Arguably, that could be
said to frustrate one of the Stencel reasons for the Feres exception-not applying state law to a military situation. Does the arguable frustration of that reason justify the application of Feres to bar
the action?
The answer to that question, I think, depends upon whether it is
appropriate to say that, because Miller was engaged in a civilian
activity, the first-level distinctively federal relationship did not exist.
If this relationship did not exist, then subjecting the military conduct
to Alaska law would be irrelevant to the applicability of Feres. After
all, if the very same military conduct had produced precisely the
same tragic consequences to a full-time civilian employee of the contractor, Feres clearly would be inapplicable. A wrongful death action
under the FTCA, arising from that civilian's death, would be wholly
appropriate and the application of Alaska law would not be considered an impropriety. 155
The problem remains that, although Miller was engaged in a
civilian activity, his general status remained that of an active duty
soldier. Consequently, it could be asserted that the first-level distinctively federal relationship, a condition precedent to the potential application of Feres, did exist. Add to that the second-level federal relationship, that between allegedly negligent military personnel and
government, and Feres might then appear to be applicable.
But the dissenters in Miller asserted that "the feared effect on
military discipline remains the most significant justification for barring servicepersons' tort claims." 158 That language could be read as
implying that, even assuming a distinctively federal relationship at
both levels-between victim and government and between tortfeasor
and government-Feres should not be applied in those cases where
an adverse effect on discipline is not likely to arise. That implication
generates a second level of inquiry: Does Stencel contemplate a necessary relationship between the impropriety of subjecting military
conduct to state law and an adverse effect on military discipline?
The three reasons set forth in Stencel appear in the following
155. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
156. 643 F.2d at 496 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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order: (1) the "distinctively federal character" of the "relationship
between the Government and members of its Armed Forces," (2)
"the Veterans' Benefits Act [which] establishes, as a substitute for
tort liability, a statutory 'no-fault' compensation scheme," and (3)
"the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline. ' 157 The
very fact that the availability of veterans' benefits was listed between
the "distinctively federal character" reason and the military discipline reason would tend to negate any inference that the Court intended to require, as a condition precedent to the application of
Feres, an intimate relationship between the first and third reasons.
Moreover, the Court seems to have viewed reasons one and three as
cures for disparate evils. With regard to the distinctively federal
character of the relationship between soldier and government, the
Court noted, "it would make little sense to have the Government's
liability to members of the Armed Services dependent on the fortuity
of where the soldier happened to be stationed at the time of the in' To demonstrate the applicability of that reason to Stencel,
jury."158
a federal supplier of ordnance, 59 the Court noted:
The Armed Services perform a unique, nationwide function in protecting the security of the United States. To that end military authorities frequently move large numbers of men, and large quantities of equipment, from one end of the continent to the other, and
beyond. Significant risk of accidents and injuries attend such a vast
undertaking. If,
as the Court held in Feres, it makes no sense to
permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negligence to affect
the liability of the Government to a serviceman who sustains service-connected injuries, .

.

. it makes equally little sense to permit

that situs to affect the Government's
liability to a Government con160
tractor for the identical injury.
With regard to the adverse effect on military discipline, however, the Court wrote that "[t]he trial would . . .involve second-

guessing military orders, and would often require members of the
Armed Services to testify in court as to each other's decisions and
actions."'6, All of this virtually compels the conclusion that the
Court contemplated that, if either of the two reasons were applicable
to a particular case, the Feres bar should be applied. And that con157. 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977).
158. Id.
159.

See id.at 667.

160. Id. at 672 (citation omitted).
161.

Id. at 673.
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clusion, in turn, suggests that if Miller's status is viewed as that of
an active duty soldier, thus satisfying the first-level distinctively federal relationship, and the negligence alleged is that of other military
personnel, thus satisfying the second-level distinctively federal relationship, Feres should apply even absent any adverse effect on military discipline. That does not mean, however, that I would concur in
the ultimate result achieved in Miller.
The propriety of the Miller result, I think, turns on a determination of which is the more appropriate characterization to be made
of Miller's status at the time of the fatal injury: civilian or active
duty soldier. If Miller, while working for a private contractor after
normal duty hours, had been struck and killed by an army vehicle
operated by an active duty soldier carrying out a military assignment, but five miles away from any military base, would Feres bar
an FTCA action? I think the answer must be no. In those circumstances, it would seem to be self-apparent that the decedent's fatal
injuries had not been incident to military service. To put it another
way, the decedent's status for Feres purposes would have been that
of a civilian. Since the first-level distinctively federal relationship
would be lacking, Feres would be inapplicable.
There are many similarities between Miller and the above hypothetical. For instance, the en banc majority opinion emphasized that
"Private Miller was on active duty; he was not on leave, pass, or
furlough. ' 62 The same characterization would apply to the hypothetical. The majority noted that, despite permission to work parttime during off-duty hours, Miller remained subject to immediate
recall for military duty. 6 ' The same could be said of our hypothetical. The majority said that although Miller's work was not directly
supervised by his military superiors, it "was related to the military
mission of the base, since it involved construction of residential
quarters to be owned by the Government and located on the
base."164 We can make that applicable to the hypothetical simply by
adding the fact that Miller was loading a truck with ladders to be
used in constructing residential quarters on a military base five miles
away, and still retain the civilian characterization of Miller for Feres
purposes. That leaves only this last reason offered by the majority:
the occurrence of the injury on the military base.165 But, as already
162. 643 F.2d at 494.
163. Id.
164. Id.

165.

Id.
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noted, even the majority rejected "a per se rule" that "every action
for injuries sustained by an active duty serviceman while on base is
166
barred by Feres."
It is true that the majority wrote: "Like all soldiers, [Miller]
was at a particular post not because he had chosen it, but because of
his orders. His survivors are entitled to compensation under the applicable acts of Congress, which require no showing of fault or
'167
negligence.
It has been determined, however, that the first sentence of that
excerpt does not constitute a reason for the Feres bar under
Stencel' 8 and that the second sentence alone does not bar an FTCA
action under Brown and Brooks."'9 Moreover, for Feres purposes,
Miller should have been assigned the particularized characterization
of civilian, eliminating the first-level distinctively federal relationship, thus making Feres inapplicable. Consequently, I find myself
compelled to conclude that the minority conclusion is the better one
and that the majority erred in applying the Feres exception to bar
recovery.
The minority seems to have assigned Miller the particularized
status of "civilian" at the time he suffered the fatal injury, since they
asserted that "[p]art-time independent employment is not a normal
part of military life."' 170 Why, then, did the minority feel compelled
to state that, of the several reasons assigned for the Feres bar, "the
feared effect on military discipline remains the most significant justification for barring servicepersons' tort claims,' 17 1 especially when
the minority recognized that the language of Stencel did not "support this conclusion." 172 And, finally, why did the minority find that
the "'distinctly federal' character of the relationship between the
government and the armed forces which should not be disturbed by
state laws," 1 3 a reason specifically asserted in Stencel,17 4 was only of
limited importance.1 75 Perhaps the answer can be distilled from the
justification for the propriety of governing distinctively federal rela166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
See supra text accompanying note 83.
643 F.2d at 497 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 496 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 496 n.9.
Id. at 496 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977).
643 F.2d at 496 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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tionships by federal law. Until now, we have accepted at face value
the "distinctively federal" reason as a justification for the Feres bar.
It would be fruitful to determine just what would be wrong with
imposing state law on that "distinctively federal" relationship. Suppose that a military act or decision occurs in state A and, as a result
of that allegedly negligent act or decision, service personnel in all
fifty states are injured. Application of the FTCA would not result in
judging the liability generating consequences of that decision by the
laws of fifty different states. The Act provides for the application of
the law of the state where the wrongful act or omission occurred.1 7
Hence, state A's law would be applied. That does not mean that
state A's law would be applied even as to issues in which state A had
absolutely no interest. Richards v. United States says that the Act's
reference to the law of state A is to be read as a reference to the
total law of that state, conflicts law as well as local law.'77 Thus, the
federal court hearing that FTCA action, and finding itself confronted with a choice-of-law problem, would be required to resolve
that issue precisely as it would be resolved by the highest appellate
court of state A.178 The due process clause179 (and perhaps the full
faith and credit clause) 80 would preclude the highest appellate court
of state A from applying the local law of any state lacking a legitimate interest in the issue to be resolved.' Consequently, every issue
in the case would have to be resolved by the application of the local
law of a state having a legitimate interest in that issue. In many
cases this would impose no undue imposition on the distinctively federal relationship between federal government and service personnel.
82
If the negligence alleged is using "a defective heating plant"'
in an army barracks in New York, the application of New York law
to resolve the negligence issue would seem to impose no undue burden on the military or the United States. If the negligence alleged is
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
177. See 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
178.

See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

§ 58

(3d ed. 1976).

179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
180. Id. art. IV, § 1.
181. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981). In
Hague, the Court concluded that Minnesota's application of its own local law permitting the
"stacking" of uninsured motorist coverage, rather than Wisconsin's local law prohibiting such
"stacking," violated neither the carrier's due process rights, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, nor
the full faith and credit clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, given Minnesota's "contacts ... with
the parties and with the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation." 449 U.S. at
308.
182. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 137 (1950).
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an army surgeon's "closing up" when "a towel 30 inches long by 18
inches wide, marked 'Medical Department U.S. Army,'"183 remains

in the incision, judging the surgeon's conduct by the law of the state
where the surgery was performed would seem to impose no undue
burden on the military or the United States. If the culpability asserted is the "negligent and unskillful medical treatment by army
surgeons, 18 4 judging the surgeons' conduct by the law of the state
where the conduct occurred would seem to impose no undue burden
on the military or the United States. After all, maintenance men and
surgeons alike should have some standard of care in mind when they
act. Why not utilize the standard imposed by the law of the state
where the conduct occurs?
On the other hand, there may be cases in which the military
action or decision is so distinctly military in nature that state law
would provide an inadequate or wholly inappropriate standard.
Which of several tanks would be most appropriate for a planned
training maneuver, which of several rifles would be most appropriate
for the basic training of infantry troops, or which of several sidearms
would be most appropriate for use by fighter pilots, would seem to be
such decisions. To judge the wisdom or reasonableness of those decisions by the law of the state in which the decisions were made might
well unduly impose on the military and the United States.
Bearing in mind the language in Feres that said jurisdiction is
as necessary to decide which actions are legally insufficient as it is to
decide which are legally sufficient, 185 and considering the viewpoint
shared by the majority and minority in Miller that a case-by-case
approach with careful analysis of the particular facts of each case is
appropriate, 186 one is impelled to conclude that the significance to be
afforded the "distinctively federal" reason for the Feres bar should
be determined in each case by assessing the actual extent to which
the military conduct or decision is distinctly or uniquely military in
nature. Where the conduct or decision is closely analogous to conduct or decisions regularly occurring in civilian life, application of
state law would not seem inappropriate. Where the conduct or decision is distinctly military in nature, application of state law might be
grossly inappropriate. I think perhaps that message is the inherent
concomitant of the Miller minority's insistence on denigrating the
183. Id.
184. Id.

185. Id. at 141.
186. 643 F.2d at 493.
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significance of the "distinctively federal" reason for Feres, when its
"civilian" characterization of Miller's status alone would have justified its conclusion that the Feres bar was inapplicable. Accordingly,
the minority went too far. Instead of diminishing the significance of
the "distinctively federal" reason across the board, the minority
might better have associated the significance of that reason with the
particular nature of the military act or decision in each case.
In Miller, the negligence alleged against military personnel was
the maintenance of an uninsulated electric wire and the failure to
187
de-energize it while construction work was carried on in the area.
Neither aspect was distinctly military in nature. On the contrary,
similar conduct by private power companies produces similar tragic
consequences in all too many cases.188 Therefore, to judge the conduct of the alleged military tortfeasors by the law of Alaska would
not seem to be an impropriety. Consequently, the Miller minority
had available to it two bases to support its conclusion that Feres was
not applicable. First, given the minority's particularized characterization of the victim as a civilian 89 -a characterization with which I
would concur-the first-level distinctively federal relationship did
not exist. That alone would compel the conclusion that the Feres bar
was not applicable. Second, even though the alleged tortfeasors were
military personnel, thus providing a second-level distinctively federal
relationship, the alleged conduct of the military personnel was not
distinctly military in nature; thus, there would have been no impropriety in judging that conduct by state law. Therefore, the distinctively federal relationship reason of Stencel was not applicable. Consequently, the minority could have supported its conclusion without
gratuitously denigrating all but the military discipline reason for the
Feres bar.
Consider also Johnson v. United States.1 90 In Johnson,
Sgt. Johnson was assigned to Fort Stewart, Georgia. In September
[, 1970,] Major Merideth, a psychiatrist at Fort Stewart, hospitalized him for a possible mental illness, and concluded he was
suffering from a severe psychosis accompanied by homocidal and
suicidal tendencies. Early in January, 1971 the sergeant was jailed
on a warrant issued after he assaulted his wife. He was released on
187. Id. at 490.
188. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Barrett v.
Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971).
189. See supra text accompanying note 167.
190. 631 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
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condition that he reenter the post hospital, and he did so on January 11, 1971. Major Merideth discharged the sergeant on January
21, 1971, even though he knew of his violent tendencies.
On January 25, 1971, Johnson requested leave, which was denied by his captain for fear he would cause more trouble. Unfortunately, the battalion executive officer overruled the captain and
granted the leave. On January 27, 1971, Sgt. Johnson went to the
home of his wife's brother in Waynesville, Georgia, approximately
80 miles from Fort Stewart. When he arrived he killed his brotherin-law, Carroll Johns, shot his wife and then killed himself. 19 1
Mrs. Johnson, who survived the shooting, brought a wrongful
death action against the United States under the FTCA.9 2 She al191.

Id. at 35 (footnote omitted).

192. Mrs. Johnson also sued the government, under the FTCA, for her own injuries. The
issue of negligence was deemed res judicata on the negligence issue in the Johnson case (i.e.,
the government was negligent in releasing Sgt. Johnson). Both the negligence issue and that of
proximate cause, therefore, were stipulated to by the parties in favor of Mrs. Johnson. 631
F.2d at 35.
Given the binding effect extended to the earlier conclusions of negligence and proximate
cause, it became unnecessary in Johnson to judicially second-guess any military conduct or
decision. It could be asserted, for that reason, that permitting an FTCA action in Johnson
would have generated no adverse effect on military discipline. However, it seems likely that the
res judicata effect given to the earlier conclusion of negligence would have become a matter of
general knowledge in Johnson. And, as suggested, Stencel seems to represent a Supreme Court
conclusion that the evil of judicially second-guessing military acts or decisions is exacerbated
in cases in which the victim is a soldier. See supra note 85.
For a variation of the traditional judicial use of Feres, consider Kohn v. United States,
680 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs, parents of a deceased soldier, asserted three causes of
action under the FTCA. "The first two [sought] to hold the United States liable. . . in damages for their son's conscious pain and suffering and for the parents' loss of his society, support
and services." Id. at 924. In those causes of action, the plaintiffs alleged that their son's death
had resulted from the negligence of his commanding officers. "In their third cause of action,
[the parents sought] recovery . . . for emotional distress allegedly inflicted on them by the
Army's treatment of them subsequent to their son's death." Id. The Second Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the first two claims on the basis of Feres but reversed the dismissal of the third
claim. Id. at 926.
The court concluded that, because the third claim asserted culpable acts occurring after
the soldier's death, Feres was not applicable. The court reasoned that "the wrongful acts alleged" in the parents' third claim were "completely independent of the purported negligent
.. . misconduct that led to their son's demise." Id. However, in the third claim, the parents
alleged, inter alia, that "'the Army [had] suppressed information'" from them concerning
their son's death. Id. at 924. It seems fair to infer that, if the third claim proceeds to trial, the
parents, in an effort to show the motive for the suppression of information, will offer evidence
of the cause of their son's death. Rather clearly, that evidence will not be "completely independent of the purported [negligence] . . . that led to their son's demise." Id. at 926. On the
contrary, it would subject to judicial scrutiny those military acts and decisions which allegedly
contributed to the soldier's death, in circumstances where there would be a significant risk of
an adverse effect on military discipline.
The Second Circuit should not have affirmed the dismissal of the third claim because the
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leged that Sergeant Johnson's suicide was the result of negligence in
parents are civilians, therefore, the first-level distinctively federal relationship is lacking. Absent that first-level relationship, Feres is inapplicable. Yet the Second Circuit wrote, "As
Stencel itself illustrates, civilian status alone is not sufficient to lift the bar under Feres when a
claim involves the same issues as if a serviceman himself sued, for then the relevant policy
considerations apply with equal force." Id. at 926. I think that constitutes too broad a reading
of Stencel, one which overlooks the fact that the civilian litigant was seeking indemnification
from the United States with regard to injuries to a pilot incident to military service. Under the
Second Circuit's view, Stencel would bar a civilian's claim for damages in any case in which
distinctly military acts or decisions would be judged by state law or judicial scrutiny of those
acts or decisions would be likely to generate an adverse effect on military discipline. That
would seem to be contrary to the purposes of the FTCA itself and to the Feres exception's
applicability to injuries incident to military service.
I can understand the "logical" appeal of the Second Circuit's conclusion that, if "the
relevant policy considerations" of Stencel apply, even an injured civilian may not recover
under the FTCA. But because I think that conclusion is inconsistent with the Act itself and
the Feres bar as to injuries incident to service, I feel it is more appropriate to conclude that the
Court has found (and Congress has acquiesced in the finding) that the evils to be avoided by
the Feres bar achieve an unacceptable level only when the injury for which compensation is
sought was sustained by a soldier. See supra note 85.
Several courts have concluded that Feres does not preclude a civilian's claim unless that
claim derives from an injury that is incident to military service. Lombard v. United States, 690
F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Hinkie v.
United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981) certified for interlocutory appeal before the
Third Circuit at Civ. Action No. 79-2340, Aug. 5, 1982. In all three cases, among the causes
asserted were claims on behalf of ex-servicemen's children who allegedly sustained genetic
injuries resulting from their parents' exposure to radiation or defoliant. In Lombard and Agent
Orange, the children's claims were characterized as derivative and arising out of the parents'
service-connected injuries, thus barred by Feres. In Hinkie, the children's claims were characterized as independent, thus not barred by Feres. As between the two conclusions, I am inclined to favor that achieved in Hinkie. Because the children allegedly sustained distinct physical injuries, I believe the "independent" characterization is the more appropriate. To me,
"derivative" claims would include "e.g., loss of society, comfort, companionship, services, consortium, guidance and support." In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 780.
In Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 4206 (U.S. Feb., 23, 1983),
decedent, a civilian employee of the United States Air Force, died in an airplane crash. Pursuant to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, the government paid death benefits to the
decedent's survivors. Subsequently, the decedent's administrator brought a wrongful death action against Lockheed, alleging that the decedent's death had been occasioned by the defendant's defective product. Lockheed, seeking indemnification, impleaded the United States. After settling the wrongful death action, Lockheed sought summary judgment against the United
States, The government argued that the exclusivity clause of the FECA, see supra note 46 and
accompanying text, precluded such liability. Finding that Lockheed was "not within any of
[the exclusivity clause's] specified categories," the Court permitted Lockheed the indemnification it sought. The majority opinion found Stencel to be inapposite because that opinion had
dealt with the "military nature of the action." Id. at 4208 n.8. That language, I think, corroborates the conclusion above that Stencel has no applicability to a civilian claim. The majority opinion also found Stencel inapplicable because that case had been decided "without regard
to any exclusive liability provision." Id. at 4208 n.8. The dissent found Stencel apposite because it did deal with an exclusive liability provision: "the compensation paid to servicemen
without regard to the government's negligence." Id. at 4209 n.4. That disagreement as to
whether Stencel dealt with an exclusive liability provision dramatizes the "iffiness" of the Vet-
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releasing him from the hospital and in granting him leave. The
United States moved to dismiss the action under Feres. The motion
to dismiss was granted 93 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting
plaintiff's argument that Sergeant Johnson's death "'had no significant link to the armed forces and was remote to his military
service.' "194

The court's conclusion can be tested by interpretation of
Stencel's three reasons for the Feres bar. Since Brooks and Brown
have never been rejected by the Court, the fact that Mrs. Johnson
may or may not receive veterans' benefits is not dispositive. Clearly,
the first-level of the distinctively federal relationship existed, since
Sergeant Johnson was on active duty in the Army. It is true, of
course, that, at the time of his suicide, Johnson was on leave and
some eighty miles from his duty station. However, it is that very fact
which plaintiff alleged was the result of negligence attributable to
the defendant. In effect, plaintiff asserted that the negligent hospital
discharge and the negligent granting of leave caused Johnson to be
in Waynesville, Georgia. Plaintiff could hardly be permitted to assert
simultaneously that Johnson was in Waynesville because of military
decisions but that his presence there was unrelated to military service. Moreover, the second-level distinctively federal relationship also
existed since the alleged tortfeasors were an Army psychiatrist and
the decedent's battalion executive officer.
Would it be inappropriate to judge the decisions made by the
alleged military tortfeasors by the law of Georgia? As we have
noted, that impropriety would exist if the decisions made were distinctly or uniquely military in nature.1" 5 The first decision-to diserans' Benefits Act reason for the Stencel decision and tends to corroborate the conclusion
achieved earlier, see supra text accompanying note 72, that that reason alone cannot be determinative of the applicability of the Feres bar. See supra text following note 86.
In Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982), the court concluded:
The underpinnings of Feres and Stencel Aero do not justify the application of
federal law [to a personal injury action brought by an Army reservist on weekend
duty against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective tractor-bulldozer manufactured by the defendant for the Department of the Army] . .

.

. [A] suit by a ser-

viceman against a government contractor presents no danger of circumventing the
limitations on governmental liability contained in the Veteran's Benefits Act [as did
Stencel's effort to secure indemnification from the government].
Id. at 248-49. That language tends to corroborate the conclusion noted with regard to Kohn,
that Stencel turned on the fact that the civilian litigant was seeking indemnification from the
United States with regard to injuries to a pilot incident to military service.
193. Johnson v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 1283 (M. D. Fla. 1976).
194. 631 F.2d at 37.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
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charge Johnson from the post hospital-would seem to be virtually
identical to decisions made regularly by psychiatrists at civilian hospitals. Therefore, to judge the reasonableness of that decision by
state law would seem to generate no undue impropriety. The second
decision-to grant Johnson leave-poses a more difficult question.
Generally, in civilian life one is free to leave his place of employment
and go where he wishes during nonworking hours. It is only in the
military that permission must be granted for such conduct. Still, vacations are a normal part of civilian life, and military leave and vacation time are closely analogous. It could be said that the decision
to grant Johnson leave was roughly equivalent to a civilian employer's granting vacation time to an employee. The difference, however, is that no civilian employer would have the right to refuse to
grant vacation time and, thereby, compel the employee to remain on
the employment premises. That power seems to be unique to the military. To the extent that it is, there would be an impropriety in judging the reasonableness of the exercise of that unique military power
by state law. Consequently, it would seem that the application of
state law to the decision to grant Johnson leave would be an undue
imposition on the distinctively federal relationship. For that reason
alone, the Fifth Circuit's decision would seem to be appropriate.
Consider also the applicability of Stencel's third reason, an adverse effect on military discipline, to the facts of Johnson. Would
judicial scrutiny of the allegedly negligent decisions leading to Johnson's hospital release and leave be likely to generate an adverse effect on military discipline? I think the answer must be yes. Such
judicial examination, with its potential for finding that each decision
was culpable, would certainly tend to make military personnel less
willing to comply with decisions relating to their own possible hospitalization or release and their own possible receipt or denial of leave.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, such judicial scrutiny and
its potential for finding culpability might very well tend to make military personnel less willing to comply with orders directing them to
work with other military personnel recently discharged from psychiatric treatment. Consequently, Stencel's third reason for the Feres
bar would seem to be applicable to Johnson and would independently corroborate the propriety of the Fifth Circuit's decision.
CONCLUSION

I believe that the Court's opinion in Stencel, distilling the reasons underlying the Feres exception to the FTCA, can be used more
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efficiently by federal courts than it has been heretofore. That more
efficient use can be accomplished if the courts will (1) accept the
existence of a relationship between the underlying reasons and the
Feres bar, and (2) examine each reason in light of the particular
facts of each case. It remains clear from Brooks and Brown that the
first reason, the availability of veterans' benefits, is not dispositive of
the issue; an FTCA action may lie whether or not such benefits are
available. Obviously, then, judicial attention must be focused on the
other two reasons. The distinctively federal relationship between government and soldier should be subjected to a dual analysis. First, the
court should determine, in a particularized manner, whether such a
relationship existed between both the victim and the United States
and the alleged tortfeasor and the United States. If either level of
the distinctively federal relationship does not exist, that reason for
the Feres bar should be deemed inapplicable. Second, if both levels
of the relationship exist, the court should determine whether the conduct or decision of the alleged tortfeasor was uniquely military in
nature. If it were not, there would be no impropriety in judging the
reasonableness of that conduct or decision by state law, and the "distinctively federal" reason should be deemed inapplicable. If, on the
other hand, the conduct or decision of the alleged tortfeasor was
uniquely military in nature, application of state law would be inappropriate, and the "distinctively federal" reason should be deemed
applicable. Finally, the court should decide whether judicial scrutiny
of the allegedly negligent conduct or decision is likely to generate an
adverse effect on military discipline. Where such an adverse effect
seems unlikely, that reason for the Feres bar should be deemed inapplicable; where such an adverse effect seems likely, that reason
should be deemed applicable. In that manner, the federal courts may
make the most efficient use possible of the Stencel decision, facilitate
the difficult task of deciding when the Feres bar applies, and achieve
an increased consistency in those decisions.
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